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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 The American Civil Rights Union (“ACRU”) 
challenges the Philadelphia City Commissioners’ failure to 
purge the city’s voter rolls of registered voters who are 
currently incarcerated due to a felony conviction. Because 
state law prohibits felons from voting while they are in 
prison, the ACRU argues that the National Voter Registration 
Act requires the Commissioners to remove them from the 
voter rolls. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of this suit.  
 
I. Background 
 
 A. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 The ACRU is a nonprofit organization that states that 
it “litigates to enforce clean voter registration rolls” and 
“promotes election integrity.”1 In January of 2016, the ACRU 
sent a letter to the Philadelphia City Commissioners, which is 
responsible for overseeing elections in Philadelphia.2 The 
letter stated, in part, that “your county is failing to comply 
with Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act 
(NVRA)” by not making “a reasonable effort to maintain 
voter registration lists free of dead voters, ineligible voters 
and voters who have moved away.”3 The letter also asked the 
Commissioners to provide, inter alia, documentation of their 
efforts to maintain accurate voter lists and “the number of 
                                                          
1 American Civil Rights Union, Mission Statement, 
http://www.theacru.org/mission-statement/ (last visited Aug. 
21, 2017). 
2 United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 954 (3d Cir. 1979). 
3 App. 36. 
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ineligible voters removed for criminal conviction.”4 The letter 
stated that its purpose was to serve as notice that the 
Commissioners could be sued under the NVRA. 
 
 The following April, the ACRU did sue the City 
Commissioners for injunctive relief pursuant to the NVRA. 
The suit alleged that the Commissioners failed to provide list 
maintenance documentation as required by 52 U.S.C. § 
20507(i) and asked to inspect the Commissioners’ records.5 
The Commissioners moved to dismiss. In June, the 
Commissioners met with the President of the ACRU and 
explained that they do not remove persons incarcerated due to 
felony conviction from the rolls or otherwise make note of 
registrants that are currently incarcerated due to felony 
conviction. They also told the ACRU that the City did not 
attempt to coordinate any efforts with law enforcement to 
identify such registrants.  
 Thereafter, the ACRU moved for a preliminary 
injunction and leave to amend its complaint. In its motion, the 
ACRU claimed “[t]he NVRA requires [the City 
Commissioners] to make a ‘reasonable effort to remove the 
names of ineligible registrants from the official lists of 
eligible voters,’ including voters ineligible by virtue of felony 
conviction.”6 The District Court concluded that the ACRU 
had “grossly misrepresented the plain language of the 
statute.”7 Instead of granting the requested relief, the Court 
sua sponte issued a Rule to Show Cause as to why the motion 
should not be stricken and why the Court should not issue 
sanctions.8 The ACRU responded that though its 
characterization of the NVRA was incomplete, the NVRA 
must be read together with the requirements of the Help 
America Vote Act (“HAVA”), and that when taken together, 
the ACRU’s position was consistent with the statutory 
                                                          
4 App. 28. 
5 Am. Civil Rights Union v. Phila. City Comm’rs, No. CV 16-
1507, 2016 WL 4721118, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2016). 
6 Pl’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 14, at 6 (quoting 52 U.S.C. 
§ 20507(a)(4)). 
7 Am. Civil Rights Union, 2016 WL 4721118, at *3. 
8 Id.  
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scheme.9 Although the Court did not sanction the ACRU for 
misrepresenting the NVRA, it did deny the motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  
 
 After additional motions were filed, the District Court 
granted the Commissioners’ motion to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint. In a very detailed and thorough analysis, the 
Court held that neither the NVRA nor HAVA requires the 
Commissioners to remove felons from the voter rolls while 
they are incarcerated.10 This timely appeal followed. 
 
 B. Statutory Background  
 
  i. National Voter Registration Act 
 
The National Voter Registration Act has four main 
goals: (1) increasing the number of registered voters, (2) 
increasing participation in federal elections, (3) maintaining 
current and accurate voter rolls, and (4) ensuring the integrity 
of the voting process.11 These goals can sometimes be in 
tension with one another: On the one hand, maintaining clean 
voter rolls may help ensure election integrity, but on the other 
hand, purging voters from the rolls requires voters to re-
register and hinders participation in elections. However, it is 
clear from the legislative history that Congress was wary of 
the devastating impact purging efforts previously had on the 
electorate. Congress noted that not only are purging efforts 
often “highly inefficient and costly” to the state by requiring 
reprocessing of registrations but also that “there is a long 
history of such cleaning mechanisms [being] used to violate 
the basic rights of citizens.”12 The drafters attempted to 
balance these concerns with the need for clean voter rolls: 
“An important goal of this bill, to open the registration 
process, must be balanced with the need to maintain the 
                                                          
9 Pl’s Resp. Order Show Cause, ECF No. 19. 
10 Am. Civil Rights Union, 2016 WL 4721118, at *9. 
11 52 U.S.C. § 20501. 
12 S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18 (1993). See also H.R. Rep. No. 
103-9, at 2 (1993) (noting that “[r]estrictive registration laws 
and administrative procedures” such as “selective purges . . . 
discourage participation.”)  
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integrity of the election process by updating the voting rolls 
on a continual basis.”13 
 
Accordingly, the NVRA both protects registered voters 
from improper removal from the rolls and places limited 
requirements on states to remove ineligible voters from the 
rolls. The section that squarely addresses these requirements, 
Section 8, is the crux of this dispute.14 That section provides 
as follows:  
In the administration of voter registration for 
elections for Federal office, each State shall . . .  
 
(3) provide that the name of a registrant may 
not be removed from the official list of eligible 
voters except— 
 (A) at the request of the registrant; 
 (B) as provided by State law, by reason 
of criminal conviction or  mental incapacity; 
or 
 (C) as provided under paragraph (4); 
 
(4) conduct a general program that makes a 
reasonable effort to remove the names of 
ineligible voters from the official lists of 
eligible voters by reason of— 
 (A) the death of the registrant; or 
 (B) a change in the residence of the 
registrant, in accordance with  subsections 
(b), (c), and (d) [notice provisions set forth in 
Section  8] . . . .15 
 
 In short, once a person is properly registered to vote, a 
state is only permitted to remove him or her from the voting 
list for narrowly specified reasons. Specifically, Congress 
                                                          
13 S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18 (1993). 
14 In the context of the NVRA, references to “Section 8 
violations” refer to violations of 52 U.S.C. § 20507. This 
terminology is derived from the section of the public law 
originally enacting the statute, Pub. L. No. 103-31, § 8, May 
20, 1993, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).  
15 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(a)(3), (a)(4).  
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allows removal if: the person dies, changes residence, asks to 
be taken off the list, or becomes ineligible under state law 
because of criminal conviction or mental incapacity. The 
NVRA also provides a private right of action so that private 
parties “aggrieved by a violation of this chapter” may sue to 
enforce the statute.16  
  
 ii. Pennsylvania’s Restriction of the Franchise 
 
 The extent to which convicted felons are denied the 
right to vote varies greatly from state to state, depending on 
the law of a given state. In states like Maine and Vermont, for 
example, individuals convicted of crimes retain the right to 
vote at all times.17 Individuals convicted of felonies may even 
register and vote from prison.18 At the other end of the 
spectrum, states like Florida and Kentucky deprive 
individuals convicted of felonies of the right to vote for the 
rest of their lives with few exceptions.19    
 
 In Pennsylvania, individuals convicted of felonies are 
only barred from voting during the period that they are 
incarcerated. Pennsylvania law specifically excludes anyone 
who is incarcerated from the definition of “qualified absentee 
                                                          
16 Id. § 20510. Before filing, the aggrieved person must 
“provide written notice of the violation to the chief election 
official of the State involved.” “If the violation is not 
corrected within 90 days after receipt of notice” or “within 20 
days after the receipt of the notice if the violation occurred 
within 120 days before the date of an election for Federal 
office, the aggrieved person may bring a civil action in an 
appropriate district court.” Id.  
17 Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 112 14; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 
2121. 
18 Elections Division, Me. Dep’t of State, Maine Voting 
Residence Fact Sheet, 2 (2012),  
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/voter-
info/residencyfacts0812.doc; Vt. Sec’y of State, Voter 
Registration Frequently Asked Questions, Elections (Dec. 22, 
2013) https://www.sec.state.vt.us/elections/frequently-asked-
questions/voter-registration.aspx.  
19 Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4(a); Ky. Const. § 145(1). 
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electors”:  
[T]he words ‘qualified absentee elector’ shall in 
nowise be construed to include persons 
confined in a penal institution or a mental 
institution nor shall it in anywise be construed 
to include a person not otherwise qualified as a 
qualified elector in accordance with the 
definition set forth in section 102(t) of this act.20 
Nevertheless, individuals registered to vote before being 
incarcerated are permitted to vote immediately upon release.21 
And those not previously registered to vote may register in 
prison if they will be released by the date of the election.22  
Thus, Pennsylvania law “do[es] not completely 
disenfranchise the convicted felon, as is the case in fourteen 
of [its] sister states; it merely suspends the franchise for a 
defined period.”23  
                                                          
20 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2602(w) (emphasis added). The 
statute’s reference to “persons confined to a penal institution” 
has been interpreted by the Pennsylvania Attorney General to 
be limited to individuals convicted of felonies. Voting by 
Untried Prisoners and Misdemeanants, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 
449, 453 (1974). 
21 Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2000), aff’d, 783 A.2d 763 (Pa. 2001). Indeed, as was the 
case for one of the plaintiffs in Mixon, incarcerated felons that 
are furloughed during an election may also vote if previously 
registered. Id. at 444–45.  
22 See id. at 421 (striking down law requiring previously-
incarcerated felons to wait five years after their conviction to 
register to vote). See also Pa. Dep’t of State, Voting Rights of 
Convicted Felons, Convicted Misdemeanants and Pretrial 
Detainees, 2 (2017) [Hereinafter Voting Rights], 
http://www.votespa.com/en-
us/Documents/Convicted_felon_brochure.pdf (identifying 
“who can register and vote” as including “[i]ndividuals who 
have been released (or will be released by the date of the next 
election) from a correctional facility”). 
23 Mixon, 759 A.2d at 448 n.11. See also Owens v. Barnes, 
711 F.2d 25, 26 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[W]hile Pennsylvania could 
choose to disenfranchise all convicted felons, it has not done 
so; unincarcerated convicted felons, such as those who have 
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 Even though Pennsylvania suspends the franchise 
during the period of incarceration, it does not require the 
removal of registrants from voter rolls due to incarceration for 
a felony conviction. Rather, Section 1909(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act, like the NVRA, directs 
that “[a]n elector’s registration shall not be canceled except” 
if the voter dies, changes residence, asks to be taken off the 
list, or removal is necessary to comply with the NVRA.24 As 
noted above, the NVRA refers only to state law, death, 
change in residence, or request of the registrant. 
 
  iii. Help America Vote Act 
 
 The HAVA was enacted in 2002 to help improve the 
equipment used to cast votes, the way registration lists are 
maintained, and how polling operations are conducted.25 
Most relevant here, the HAVA builds on the NVRA by 
requiring that each state maintains a computerized database 
for voter registrations.26 Similar to the NVRA, the HAVA 
requires states to “perform list maintenance” of the 
computerized voting rolls.27 It also attempts to increase voter 
participation by limiting the manner in which states may 
remove voters from the voting rolls. The HAVA provides that 
states may not remove individuals from the voter rolls unless 
they do so “in accordance with the provisions of the National 
Voter Registration Act.”28 In addition, should a state seek to 
remove a registered voter from the list due to death or 
criminal conviction, states must “coordinate the computerized 
                                                                                                                                  
been sentenced to probation or released on parole, may 
vote.”). 
24 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1901(a). 
25 Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: 
Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote 
Act, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1206, 1207 (2005). 
26 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A). 
27 Id. § (a)(2)(A). 
28 Id. § (a)(2)(A)(i). As we noted earlier, the Congressional 
goals in enacting the NVRA include: increasing the number 
of registered voters and increasing participation in federal 
elections. 52 U.S.C. § 20501. 
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list with State agency records.”29 This is the only reference in 
the HAVA to removal of voters from the rolls due to criminal 
conviction.  
 
 Unlike the NVRA, however, the HAVA does not 
include a private right of action that allows aggrieved parties 
to sue nonconforming states. Subchapter IV of the HAVA 
includes only two mechanisms for enforcement: (1) a civil 
action brought by the Attorney General,30 and (2) 
administrative complaint.31 
 
II. Discussion32 
 As we noted at the outset, we must determine whether 
the NVRA requires the Philadelphia City Commissioners to 
purge the voter rolls of individuals who are currently 
incarcerated for a felony conviction. The ACRU argues that it 
does, relying on Section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) of the NVRA as 
read together with the HAVA. Because Pennsylvania does not 
permit individuals to vote while incarcerated for a felony, the 
ACRU argues, the Commissioners are required to remove 
them from the rolls.  We disagree.  
 
                                                          
29 Id. § (a)(2)(A)(ii)(1). 
30 Id. § 21111. 
31 Id. § 21112. 
32 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
When reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), our review of the 
district court is plenary. See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle 
Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011). The Rules of 
Civil Procedure demand that a plaintiff present “only ‘a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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 Like the District Court, we need look no further than 
the text of Section 8 itself to resolve this dispute. “When [a] 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at 
least where the disposition required by the test is not 
absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”33 Here, the 
unambiguous text of Section 8 reveals that while states are 
required to make reasonable efforts to remove registrants for 
certain reasons, states are merely permitted—not required— 
to provide for removal of registrants from the official list 
based on criminal conviction.  
 
 Congress’s only reference to criminal conviction in the 
statute is contained in Section 8(a)(3). Section 8(a)(3) states 
that “each State shall . . . provide that the name of a registrant 
may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters 
except” among other reasons, “as provided by State law, by 
reason of criminal conviction.”34  The statute thus places an 
obligation on the States to ensure that registrants are not 
removed improperly. Thus, Congress limited the authority of 
states to encumber voter participation by permitting states to 
only remove registrants for the exceptions specified. As set 
forth above, under Section 8, states can remove a voter: if the 
voter asks to be taken off the list, dies, changes residence, or 
becomes ineligible under state law because of criminal 
conviction or mental incapacity.35  
 
 This reading is consistent with the NVRA’s central 
purpose of “ensur[ing] that, once registered, voters could not 
be removed from the registration rolls” for improper 
purposes.36 Thus, given the importance of the right to vote,37 
                                                          
33 United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) 
(alteration omitted). 
34 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
35 Id.  
36 Welker v. Clarke, 239 F.3d 596, 598–99 (3d Cir. 2001). 
37 See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 
(1966) (“[T]he right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and 
political rights . . . .” (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
561–62 (1964)).  
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we emphasize that Section 8(a)(3) is designed to protect 
voters from improper removal and only provides very limited 
circumstances in which states may remove them. Therefore, 
contrary to the ACRU’s assertions, the text of Section 8(a)(3) 
places no affirmative obligations on states (or voting 
commissions) to remove voters from the rolls. As its text 
makes clear, NVRA was intended as a shield to protect the 
right to vote, not as a sword to pierce it.  
 
 The following subsection, 8(a)(4), similarly does not 
require states to purge voters convicted of felonies from the 
rolls. It does, however, place an affirmative obligation on 
states to make “reasonable efforts” to remove registrants in 
certain specific circumstances in order to ensure the accuracy 
of the voter lists. This limited authority is consistent with the 
NVRA’s purpose to “ensure that accurate and current voter 
registration rolls are maintained.” 38 Here again, Congress 
was careful to very narrowly limit the circumstances that 
would justify removing voters in the interest of ensuring the 
accuracy of voting lists. Section 8(a)(4) mandates that “each 
State shall . . . make[] a reasonable effort to remove the 
names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible 
voters by reason of— (A) the death of the registrant; or (B) a 
change in the residence of the registrant.”39 By its terms, the 
mandatory language in Section 8(a)(4) only applies to 
registrants who have died or moved away.40 Removal due to 
criminal conviction is not included on this list of mandatory 
purging, and we will not amend the statute by reading that 
requirement into its text when Congress obviously chose not 
to do so.41 
                                                          
38 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b). 
39 Id. § 20507(a)(4). 
40 See Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 83 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily the language of 
command.” (quoting Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 
(2001)). 
41 See United States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 
1996) (“It is a canon of statutory construction that the 
inclusion of certain provisions implies the exclusion of others. 
The doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius ‘informs a 
court to exclude from operation those items not included in a 
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 Our conclusion is further bolstered by the NVRA’s 
legislative history. The Senate Report explains “States are 
permitted to remove the names of eligible voters from the 
rolls at the request of the voter or as provided by State law by 
reason of mental incapacity or criminal conviction.”42  The 
Report continues: “[i]n addition, States are required to 
conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to 
remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists 
by reason of death or a change in residence.”43 This obvious 
distinction between the permissive language in (a)(3) and the 
mandatory language in (a)(4) demonstrates that the statute 
and the legislative history are in agreement: States and 
election officials are permitted—but not required—to remove 
individuals ineligible to vote under state law due to criminal 
conviction. 
 
 The ACRU makes several arguments in an attempt to 
rewrite the statute to support its desired outcome. First, the 
ACRU cites a case decided by the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri to assert that Section 8(a)(4)’s 
affirmative obligation that states “make[] reasonable effort[s] 
to remove the names of ineligible voters” in fact “appl[ies] to 
the other subsections of Section 20507,” including subsection 
8(a)(3).44 On this basis, the ACRU asserts that the “NVRA 
itself contains a requirement that election officials make a 
reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible by 
operation of state law as a result of criminal conviction.”45 
                                                                                                                                  
list of elements that are given effect expressly by the statutory 
language.’” (quoting In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1119, 1123 (3d Cir. 
1995)). 
42 S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18 (1993) (emphasis added). 
43 Id. (emphasis added).  See also H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, at 15 
(1993) (“Recognizing the essential need to maintain the 
integrity of the voter registration lists, the bill requires that 
States conduct a general program that makes a reasonable 
effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the 
official lists of eligible voters by reason of death or by a 
change of residence.”) (emphasis added).  
44 Appellant’s Br. 14. 
45 Appellant’s Br. 14. 
14 
 
 
 This argument not only mangles the statute beyond 
recognition, it also misrepresents the non-precedential case it 
relies on. There is simply no support for the proposition that 
the mandatory list-maintenance provision in subsection 
8(a)(4) applies to subsection 8(a)(3). Further, the district court 
case the ACRU cites for this proposition—United States v. 
Missouri—held no such thing. Rather, the court considered 
only the text of Section 8(a)(4) itself—it did not discuss or 
mention subsection 8(a)(3) at all—and held that subsection 
(a)(4)’s “reasonable effort” requirement applied to the 
subsections incorporated by reference within Section 8(a)(4) 
itself.46 The statute serves as its own illustration: 
In the administration of voter registration for 
elections for Federal office, each State shall . . .  
 
(4) conduct a general program that makes a 
reasonable effort to remove the names of 
ineligible voters from the official lists of 
eligible voters by reason of— 
 (A) the death of the registrant; or 
 (B) a change in the residence of the 
registrant, in accordance with  subsections 
(b), (c), and (d) . . . 47 
 
Notably, unlike the subsections Missouri discussed (italicized 
above), subsection 8(a)(3) is not incorporated by reference in 
(a)(4). Thus, even if the analysis of a district court in Missouri 
were persuasive, that court’s analysis would still be irrelevant 
to our inquiry here.  
 
                                                          
46 United States v. Missouri, No. 05-4391-CV-C-NKL (NKL), 
2006 WL 1446356, at *8 (W.D. Mo. May 23, 2006), rev’d, 
535 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (“While the NVRA is 
ambiguous, both its text and common sense suggests that 
Congress intended the ‘reasonable effort’ standard of § 
1973gg-6(a)(4) to apply to subsections (b), (c) and (d). 
Subsection (a)(4), which contains the reasonable effort 
standard, is a general, introductory provision and incorporates 
by reference subsections (b), (c) and (d).”). 
47 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4).  
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 In its Reply Brief, the ACRU doubles down on this 
argument and asserts that because (a)(4) references subsection 
8(c) and because subsection 8(c)(2)(B) in turn references 
subsection (a)(3), the mandatory language of (a)(4) therefore 
applies to (a)(3) via 8(c).48 This is exactly the kind of 
statutory contortion that led the District Court to respond to 
the ACRU’s arguments by threatening to impose sanctions 
for blatant misrepresentation of the statute. Nothing in this 
game of statutory Twister plausibly suggests that the plainly 
mandatory language in (a)(4) should be substituted for the 
plainly permissive language of (a)(3).49   
 The ACRU then turns to another federal statute for 
support. It argues that the NVRA is “enhanced by the parallel 
obligations found in the Help America Vote Act.”50 The 
ACRU argues that when read together, “list maintenance 
regarding ineligible felons is mandatory in states such as 
Pennsylvania that have determined that incarceration for a 
felony is disqualifying.”51 The ACRU points to two 
provisions of HAVA that purportedly “broaden[]” or 
                                                          
48 Reply Br. 10–11.  
49 Indeed, subsection (c)(2)(B)’s reference to (a)(3) 
specifically states that the removal of names should be 
conducted “on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) . . .  of 
subsection (a).” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(2)(B) (emphasis 
added). As noted, Section 8(a)(3) is permissive, not 
mandatory, and nothing in subsection (c)(2)(B) changes that. 
At oral argument, the ACRU relied even more heavily on 
Section 8(c)(2)(A), arguing that it mandates states to remove 
“ineligible voters” within 90 days of the election and 
therefore, incarcerated felons must be removed. E.g. Oral 
Arg. at 1:01:37, 1:02:46. See also 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(2)(A) 
(“A State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the 
date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any 
program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the 
names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible 
voters.”). For the reasons already discussed above and for the 
reasons outlined by the District Court, we do not find this 
argument persuasive. See Am. Civil Rights Union, 2016 WL 
4721118, at *6. 
50 Appellant’s Br. 3. 
51 Appellant’s Br. 8–9. 
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“augment” the NVRA: (1) Section 21083(a)(4)(A), which 
requires election officials to make “a reasonable effort to 
remove registrants who are ineligible from the official list of 
ineligible voters,”52 and (2) Section (a)(2)(A)(ii) which 
directs that a “State shall coordinate the computerized list 
with State agency records on felony status” “[f]or the 
purposes of removing names of ineligible voters [under the 
NVRA Section 8(a)(3)].”53 
 
 However, even if that interpretation is correct, the 
ACRU would still be out of court. Unlike the NVRA, the 
HAVA does not include a private right of enforcement. By its 
text, the HAVA only allows enforcement via attorney general 
suits or administrative complaint.54 Not surprisingly, the 
ACRU cites nothing to support its assumption that it may 
graft the NVRA’s private right of action onto a wholly 
separate statutory scheme simply because the second statute 
refers to the first.  To the contrary, the fact that the NVRA 
provides for a private right of action while the HAVA does 
not clearly indicates Congress’s intent to limit HAVA’s 
enforcement mechanism to preclude a private suit.55 
“Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private 
damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so 
expressly.”56 Furthermore, as the District Court noted, circuit 
courts do not even agree about whether plaintiffs may bring a 
Section 1983 action to enforce the HAVA.57 Thus, insofar as 
                                                          
52 Appellant’s Br. 11–12 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)). 
53 Appellant’s Br. 15 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 
21083(a)(2)(A)(ii)). 
54 52 U.S.C. §§ 21111, 21112. 
55 See In re Federal-Mogul Glob. Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 373 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the legislature has inserted a provision 
in only one of two statutes that deal with closely related 
subject matter, it is reasonable to infer that the failure to 
include that provision in the other statute was deliberate 
rather than inadvertent.”). 
56 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 
(1979). 
57 Am. Civil Rights Union, 2016 WL 4721118, at *5 
(comparing Colon-Marrero v. Velez, 813 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 
2016) (recognizing there is no private right of action under 
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the HAVA places a burden on state election officials above 
and beyond the NVRA, the ACRU is unable to enforce such 
requirements in this suit.  
 
 Even assuming the ACRU could ground a right to sue 
in the HAVA, the statute would still not support the ACRU’s 
claims. The unambiguous text of the HAVA simply does not 
require election officials to purge voter rolls of incarcerated 
felons. 
 
 The first section of the HAVA relied on by the ACRU, 
Section 21083(a)(4)(A), states that “[t]he State election 
system shall include provisions to ensure . . . [a] system of 
file maintenance that makes a reasonable effort to remove 
registrants who are ineligible to vote from the official list of 
eligible voters.”58 The ACRU argues that this section requires 
states to remove all registrants who are unable to cast a ballot 
under state law. However, the HAVA also states that “such 
system” should be “consistent with the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993.”59 Moreover, even if that directive 
was not clear, Section (2)(A)(i) states that “[i]f an individual 
is to be removed from the computerized list, such individual 
shall be removed in accordance with the provisions of the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993.”60 We have already 
explained that the NVRA does not require election officials to 
purge registrants from the rolls who are not permitted to vote 
due to felony conviction. And by its text, the HAVA requires 
no more.61  
                                                                                                                                  
the HAVA, but permitting a Section 1983 suit); Sandusky 
Cty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (same); with Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada 
Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 735 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing 
there is no private right of action under the HAVA, and 
foreclosing a Section 1983 suit)). 
58 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(A). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. § 21083(2)(A)(i). 
61 In its opinion, the District Court went a step further and 
concluded that individuals incarcerated due to criminal 
conviction are not “ineligible voters” under the HAVA 
because “Pennsylvania law ‘merely suspends the franchise for 
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 The ACRU also argues that the District Court’s 
interpretation is inconsistent with provisions of the HAVA 
and the NVRA that set forth reporting and information-
sharing requirements designed to assist states in removing 
registrants convicted of felonies. Specifically, the ACRU 
points to: (1) 52 U.S.C. § 20507(g)(1), which requires U.S. 
attorneys to send written notice of felony convictions for list 
maintenance purposes; (2) 52 U.S.C. § 20507(g)(5), which 
requires state election officials to give this information to 
local voter registration officials; and (3) 52 U.S.C. § 
21083(a)(2)(A)(ii), which requires states to coordinate with 
law enforcement agencies regarding felony status. The ACRU 
argues that “the only plausible reason for requiring this 
information to be sent to local election officials is so that they 
can make note of the registrants who are ineligible by reason 
of criminal status,”62 and therefore, the Commissioners are 
required to purge or make note of those individuals.63  
 
 As the District Court so aptly reasoned, a requirement 
that information be shared does not impose a duty on election 
officials to subsequently act on that information by purging 
those individuals from the voter rolls in disregard of the law 
                                                                                                                                  
a defined period.’” Am. Civil Rights Union, 2016 WL 
4721118 at *9 (quoting Mixon, 759 A.2d at 448 n.11). We 
agree. Moreover, under the definition of “qualified absentee 
voter,” ineligibility depends upon “confinement,” and, under 
state law, individuals convicted of felonies are permitted to 
vote if they are on furlough from prison or are serving a 
period of home confinement. Oral Arg. at 1:22; Voting Rights 
at 2. Thus, they remain eligible to vote but are not provided 
access to the ballot while incarcerated. 
62 Appellant’s Br. 16.  
63 The ACRU argues that if the NVRA does not require the 
Commissioners to purge voters that are incarcerated for a 
felony conviction, it must at the very least require that those 
voters be “flagged” or “notated” to indicate that they are not 
currently able to vote. Appellant’s Br. 18–19. The ACRU 
cites no authority for the proposition and we can find none. 
We thus decline to read a notation requirement into the statute 
where Congress has not written it.  
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of their state.64 In addition, contrary to the ACRU’s 
assertions, we do not think the District Court’s reading makes 
these provisions superfluous or redundant. The information-
sharing provisions are no doubt very helpful in states such as 
Florida and Kentucky where individuals convicted of felonies 
are permanently deprived of the right to vote. By contrast, the 
information would have no utility in Maine and Vermont 
where citizens may vote regardless of criminal status. 
Congress simply required the sharing of certain information 
so that states would have the information necessary to 
maintain voter lists pursuant to state law. As the District 
Court observed, “[i]nformation sharing in itself is important, 
and ensures that all states will have the information necessary 
regarding federal convictions, whether that information is 
acted upon or not.”65 These information-sharing provisions 
certainly do not dictate that Maine or Vermont must act to 
remove felons from the voter rolls contrary to state law, and 
they do not so dictate here.  
 
 Finally, the ACRU argues that the District Court was 
wrong to “look at particular subsections [of the statutes] one 
by one rather than as a whole” to reach its conclusion.66 
Certainly context matters, and a statute must be considered as 
a whole.67 Yet here, neither statute says what the ACRU 
claims—neither the NVRA nor the HAVA come close to 
requiring the Commissioners to purge the voter rolls of 
individuals incarcerated due to felony conviction.  
 
 Moreover, requiring the Commissioners to purge the 
rolls of incarcerated felons would contravene one of the main 
goals the NVRA itself. Congress has declared that the statute 
is designed to “enhance[] the participation of eligible citizens 
                                                          
64 Am. Civil Rights Union, 2016 WL 4721118, at *8. 
65 Id.  
66 Appellant’s Br. 10.  
67 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (“[W]e must 
do our best, bearing in mind the fundamental canon of 
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read 
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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as voters in elections for Federal office.”68 In Pennsylvania, 
individuals convicted of a felony are citizens who can vote 
the moment they are released from prison, regardless of 
probation or parole status.69 If an individual is purged from 
the rolls while incarcerated, he or she will be required to re-
register after release. Voter registrations take time to process, 
and the state further imposes a 30-day cutoff before an 
election, after which new registrants are ineligible to vote in 
an upcoming election.70 However, under Pennsylvania law, a 
previously-registered individual released the morning of 
November 8, 2016 would be eligible to vote in the election 
that day. The ACRU’s position would preclude that eligible 
voter from casting a vote, a result that would clearly 
contravene Congress’s announced intention of protecting 
access to the polls and increasing voter turnout.71  
 Accordingly, we hold that the very thorough and 
thoughtful opinion of the District Court is clearly correct and 
entirely in keeping with the “whole law” and the “object and 
policy” of the NVRA.72 It is the ACRU’s interpretation of the 
                                                          
68 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(2). 
69 See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451; Owens, 711 F.2d at 26. 
70 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1326. 
71 We also note that during purging efforts, election officials 
often inadvertently remove voters not convicted of felonies 
which even more dramatically disenfranchises eligible voters. 
As Amici Curiae Project Vote and Demos outline in their 
brief, officials that have undertaken purges in the past have 
removed hundreds—if not thousands—of registrants who 
have not been convicted of felonies due to improper matching 
procedures. Amici Curiae Br. 17–23 (citing Myrna Pérez, 
Brennan Center for Justice, Voter Purges (2008), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/public
ations/Voter.Purges.f.pdf). As a result, registrants such as 
those with similar names as convicted felons or registrants 
only convicted of misdemeanors are improperly purged from 
the rolls, and most do not find out until they are denied a 
ballot on Election Day. See Pérez, supra at 2–3.  
 
72 See Appellant’s Br. 11 (quoting Prestol Espinal v. Att’y 
Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
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NVRA, not the Commissioners’, that most threatens the goals 
of the statute and the integrity of the vote.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 In summary, because the ACRU is unable to present a 
plausible claim that the NVRA requires the Commissioners to 
purge Philadelphia’s voter rolls of individuals incarcerated 
due to felony conviction, we affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the ACRU’s suit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
